Resumo o artigo apresenta urn modelo que formaliza 0 argumcnto de Keynes sobre a rigidez nominal clos salarios. Varias resultados sao obtidos, dentre des 0 efeito da aversao ao risco dos trabalhadores. Alcm disso, provam�se resultados auxiliares sabre equilibrios de Nash em jogos simetricos.
Nominal wage rigidity is the fundamental mechanism in the traditional macroeconomic model of Keynes. It is through this that the government can adjust the economy to the full employ rnent level. Yet no good model to explain this phenomenon exists. Models of price rigidity, like Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , and Shapiro a.nd Stiglitz (1982) , or similar ones, consider only real prices. The one I shall present here is consistent only with nominal rigidities. The existing formal models of nominal price rigidity are of the type of the "kinked demand curve" as in Henderson and Quandt ( 1958) . As is well known this is a completely "ad-hoc" procedure. The explanation that is most popular, however, is Hmoney illu s ion". This argument basically says that the employees do not pay attention, at least immediately, to the real wage. They take S'0me time to realize that they gained or lost purchasing power ,-by the decrease or increase of the general price level. In other words, the workers are deluded by nominal figures. Although this idea is intuitively appealing, it would mean a kind of irrational behaviour on the part of the employees. After all it is not necessary to be a genius, or even to make calculations, to understand that other prices are going up, but not your wage.
Another argument in favour of money wages rigidity is the empirical evidence. In fact this has been noticed in various coun tries. Most striking evidence is the stickiness of money wages during the great depression, and the recent Chilean experience, where the government tried to control inflation and unemploy ment through a monetary approach to the balance of payments, but never succeeded to control the latter, because of the rigidity of the nominal wages. However the economist should try to ex plain every component orhis model, even when the hypothesis is empirically observed.
How then could we analyse the problem? The answer! as Tobin (1972) notices, is given by Keynes (1936) in his General Theory, eh. 2.m. Let us quote the passage, to avoid misinterpre tation: Though the struggle over money-wages between individuals and groups is often believed to determine the general level of real wages, it is, in fact, concerned with a different object.
Since there is imperfect mobility of labour, and wages do not tend to an exact equality of net advantage in different occu pations, any individual or group of individuals, who consent to a reduction of money-wages relatively to the others, will suffer a relative reduction in real wages, which is sufficient justification for them to resist it. On the other hand it would be impracticable to resist every reduction of real wages, due to a change in the purchasing-power of money which affects all workers alike; and in fact reductions of real wages arising in this way are not, as a rule, resisted unless they proceed to an extreme degree.
As we see this idea is much more plausible: workers are con cerned about their relative position ;.: the society. But somebody has to start the process of cutting wages. So the employees of that firm will resist the wage cut, in order to avoid a worsening relative to the others. The same does not occur when the cut in the wages occurs through a loss of purchasing�power, because every worker is affected in the same way.
The aim of this article is to set up a formal model for the above argument.
Firms.
In this model firms will be considered as usually profit max imizers, taking wages and prices as given. If we suppose a pro duction function y, = F,(N) with F[ > 0 and F[' < 0 for a particular firm i, then N, (the demand for labour of firm i) is . W glven by F[(N;) = p' Now an external shock occurs and alters the derivative of Fi . Assume it is a negative supply shock (F[(Ni) > F;" (Ni) 'VN,) . Under the assumption that firms always operate on the demand curve (this may be contradicted sometimes), we have as a consequence that either N, or � decreases.
Again let us suppose the price P cannot be affected at all, but there are frictions on the labour market. Then the employers may offer a wage cut to the employees in order to avoid massive firing. We will analyse here the extreme c1ll' e in which the firms offer a cut in wages or fire workers. It is clear that a more complete anal ysis would require a compromise between wages and employment. This discussion justifies the following behaviour of firms, taken as the first hypothesis: (a) Firm i proposes to its employees the following scheme: either you accept an once and for all reduction in noninal wages by Ih %, or we will have to fire at random a proportion Pi % of you.
Observe that, in the way the cut in wages is modeled here, one does not allow a dependence on the unknown price level! otherwise the model could give as a result rigidity in real wages. The main question is whether or not the reduction offered by the firms is nominal or real. The viewpoint of this paper is that the firms offer a nominal cut.
Workers.
They are the key agents of the model. To formalize Keynes irlea! we have to assume that workers have a utility function de pending upon relative wages, on the expected utility hypothesis of Von Neumann-Morgenstern. This can be seen as a consump t Ion externality on the usual neoclassical model} where preferences over bundles are also infl uenced by prices in this particular way. This can be justifi ed by means of envy, or status desire.
We will ignore here effects other than the externality itself. This gives us the second hypothesis: (b) The employees are concerned only with their relative position in society, represented only by their wages relative to the rest of society. It is obviolls that this is not entirely realistic, even in the sim ple context we will be dealing with. In a more general model one could also think that the employees worry about unemployment.
Another hypothesis will be that workers of the same firm act together, in the sense that they all together accept or refuse to have their wages altered. This can be viewed as a kind of union acting only in each firm. Also we will suppose that the answer they will give to the employers is either "yes" Or "no". They could also: (i) go on strike; (ii) counter offer a cut less than 0, % (they could go even further: ask for increases in their nominal wages); (iii) quit the job to search for a better wage; (iv) take into account that they will, very probably, face a similar situation again. Most of these points have been noticed by Simonsen ( 1982) . However the idea is to keep the model as simple as possible to get the results we will, without departing from the Keynesian viewpoint. It should be clear that it would be interesting to complicate the model to include all these effects. This discussion can be summarized as follows: (c) The employees answer to (a) independently per firm, and only accepting or refusing the wage cut. Finally, as a simplification we will assume: (d) The unemployment wage is zero. 4. The model.
As Simonsen (1982) noticed, the Keynesian view of the sub ject is a game theoretic one. 1 He also understood that the simple argument in the General Theory would admit as the only equi librium point the downward rigidity of nominal wages. As it is well known this does not happen in practice: in the U.S.A. money wages ren between 1929 and )933. What is empirically observed is the resistance to a decrease, and not absolute rigidity. The model that will be developed in this section wiII take this point into account.
Two other assumption (in addition to (a) -(d)) are needed. The first one is just a consistency one, to make explicit that the behaviour of the labour market cannot be a competitive one: ( e) The labour market has imperfect mobility.
The second one avoids unnecessary complications: (f) The firms employ the same kind of worker with the same utility function and the same initial wage. With hypotheses (a) to (f), and, for the moment, assuming that th ere are only two firms, we have the following game:
(i) two players, each one representing the workers of one firm; (ii) each of them answering ((yes" or "nd' to the proposal of its firm. If "yes" he keeps the job, but his wage decreases. If "no" he has a chance of being fired, and face unemployment. They will be supposed to act non-cooperatively. Let the utility of player i be u(x) where x is the wage of em ployees of firm i divided by the average wage of employees of firm j, j # i. With two firms Ul(Wl,W2) = u(� l ), and
). With n-firms:
n-l L... . J j ;t. i b€ing Wj the average nominal wage for the workers of firm j , and Wi the wage of the persons of firm i. Let w be the initial money wage, and 0i and Pi be given by (a).
We have four cases; (i) Both players accept the cut: in this case we have that no employee is fired and both wages are cut:
(ii) Player one accepts the cut and player two does not: in this case
(iii) Player two accepts the cut and player one does not: this is symmetric to (ii).
1-O2 U2 =u(--)
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(iv) Both players refuse to accept the cut:
This gives us the following payoff configuration: As it will be seen in an example in a following section anything can occur in-such a situation: any of the four configurations can be achieved as Nash equilibrium for a convenient choice of the parameters 01 , (J2, PI J P2· I U e-al) I-a,
.;::
1-a1
The first thing to be noticed is existence of equilibrium (Nash) in this context, by Theorem 1 in the appendix} since our general
InDdel of the last section is a symmetric game in the case Pl -= P'2; = P, and 81 = 82 = () 1 that is treated here.
Symmetry allows us to say something about the behaviour of the workers. . This is the same as:
. This satisfies the desired properties. We will show now that
But, again by the fact F is strictly decreasing in 0 for every given p, it is clear that p'(O) = p'(O') cannot happen. This completes the proof.
0
The intuition behind this result is very clear: if the proba bility of being fi red is low enough (where "enough)) depends on the cut in nominal wages in a increasing way) then it is a rational attitude for the workers to refuse the wage cut.
It is important to notice that if the employees are risk lovers, then it may be optimal to refuse the wage cut always, no matter how low is the probability of being fired. This will be seen in the next section, in example 4. Nonetheless this kind of behaviour can never be verified in risk averse or risk neutral individuals. In fact:
Proposition 2. If u is risk neutral or risk averse, and continuous
not a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF: Let us assume again ufO) = 0, and F(O, p) is defi ned as in the p�oof of the fi rst proposition. We will show that there exists Olle and only one p'( O)<[O, 1[ such that F(O,p'(O)) = 0, and as F(O, O) < 0, this will show that the theorem is true. In fact,
1-P Notice that risk neutral individuals also have concave utility
in p, aad this proves the result, being it sufficient to take p.
To prove this observe that it is enough to show that
is nonincreasing in p, which follows from the fact I-p that u concave and This proposition shows that risk aversion is an important feature to avoid triviality of results: if employees are risk averse (or risk neutral) and the probability of being fi red is high enough (again, as in Theorem 1, "enough" depends in an increasing way on the intensity of the cut in nominal wages), then it is not rational for them to refuse the wage cut.
The next proposition characterizes the rationality of the ac ceptance of the wage cut.
Proposition 3. Given a continuous utility function in [0, +00[, s�rictly increasing, then VB > 0 there exists 0 < p"(O) < 1, st-rictly increasing with e , such that p 2: p"(e) => (Yes, Yes) is a }rash Equilibrium. Furthermore p < p"(e) => (Yes, Yes) is not a fr.E ..
Yes) and U2 (Yes
The rest follows easily.
0
The intuition of the result above is obviously exactly the op posite of Propositions 1 and 2. If the chance of being fired is high enough then the workers of both firms accept the cut. If it is low enough then it is not optimal to accept the cut.
The corollaries that follow just show when the behaviour is straightforward. These corollaries show one of the main points: we can have sticky wages, but when the probability of being fi red becomes high enough, like in a great depression, then the rational action is to accept the reduction in wages.
By means of Theorem 2 of the appendix, one sees that the actions that result from Corollaries 1 and 2 are strictly dominant strategies. This could induce one to think that no game interac tion is present in the model. However two points should be noted. First, this is a general property of symmetric games which, by no chance, is particular to the model. Second,/there are lots of sit uations where non-trivial behaviour can occur. as later examples will show, even in the symmetric case. A particularly interesting kind of nontrivial behaviour is an example where all equilibria are asymmetric. This happens, for the following utility function: that propositions analogous to 1, 2 and 3 are still valid. Notice L11at. we cannot say the same with respect to corollaries 1 and 2,
.. nd a more detailed analysis should be done. However we do not i-l, ill!: t.hese corollaries are central results, and for this reason we ��-il! not deepen in these details. The model is then robust with argull1enting the number of firms.
6. The influence of risk aversion.
The risk aversion coefficient, as defined in Pratt (1964) plays a fundamental role on the results. As one would expect, the more risk averse the individual, the less propense he is to submit himself to unemployment. Therefore as a result one would like to get that, gi ven the wage cut O J the more risk averse he is, the more likely h", is of accepting the cut and, the less likely he is of refusing it. T he next proposition shows that this is the case. 
Without loss of generality we can assume uI(l) = 1-p 1 u2(1) = 1 =} k(l) = 1. Then:
The proposition above says that, for given 0, the region where
shrinks with the increase of risk aversion, whereas the region where (Yes, Yes) is equilibrium (p 2': p"(O)) enlarges with it.
In the next section some examples are shown. This section is a collection of examples . They are intended to show the richness of behaviour allowed by the model, and to stress particular points that were not taken into account explicitly.
EXAMPLE 1: The Influence of Risk Aversion in a Simple Behavior
This example will be d0ne by using the function u(x) = x l-a .
It has the property of constant relative risk aversion (= x::;�:J;» , tha.t equals to a. In here we will consider a < 1. The case of constant relative risk aversion n 2: 1 is not consistent with
After a simple calculation p'(8) = p"(8) = 1-(1 _ 8) I-a . Th" figure, for 0 < � O' < 1, would be:
No W, if a is varying, we have:
As the figure shows, as risk aversion increases it grows the are.a where the reduction in wages is accepted, and the opposite whEn it decreases. This will be the general Influence of risk aver- Let u(x) = l_e-ox. This is a constant absolute risk aversion utility function, where risk aversion (absolute) is "'.
The graph of p' (0) and p" (0) is as in the later example.
The infl uence of risk aversion may be easily calculated, and by Proposition 4 both curves decrease when risk aversion increases.
EXAMPLE 4: The behavior of risk lover individuals Now we will consider u(x) = eax -1 (constant absolute risk aversion = -1 ). In this case we have that p'(O) = 1 for 0 > .35
(indeed a number a bit lower), basically because the function H(p) of Proposition 2 is not strictly increasing. It is possible to calculate numerically the behaviour: 
-PI
Let u(x) = x, a very simple utility function, and let us con sider that firms do not act symmetrically. Then we have the fol lowing game:
We have nine cases. Only four of them will be shown, since the other five are just degenerate cases of these four: (i) p, < 0, and P2 < O2 � (No, No) unique Nash Equilibrium.
(ii) p, < 0, and P2 > O2 � (No, Yes) unique Nash Equilibrium. (iii) p, > 0, and P2 < 0, � (Yes, No) unique Nash Equilibrium. (iv) P' > 0, and P2 > O2 � (Yes, Yes) unique Nash Equilibrium.
These results show that if the behaviour of the firms is not the same, then it may be optimal for its workers to act differently. Moreover they act in a quite intuitive way: if both chances of being fired are small, then none accept the wage cut. On the other hand, if one is high and the other is low, the former will accept and the latter will not. The other cases have similar intuition. In this situation the apparenlly inocuous hypothesis (c) is crucial. In fact, let us suppose it pr, evails an unemployment rate of 6% uniformly in all the unions of the fi rms. Also assume the Table 2 .
. . . ... . . . ..
+(I-5+p)u( r.\;;p )
workers are offered the following scheme (this scheme is compat i !ole with the behaviour of the firms, as described in paragraph 2):
(g) We will increase your wage in B% or recontract p% of the unemployed of your union (in the model it is not possible p > 0). Now J if a worker decide only in a selfish way, it always pays t<0 him to accept the wage increase. This is obvious from the factIf the increase is accepted: w = w(1 + 0) employed { 0 unemployed (6%) ((1 -6)%) and tv = (1 -6)w(1 + 0).
w employed ((1 -6 + p)%) and tv = (1 -6 + p)w.
This gives us, in the two fi rm example, the payoff matrix: For these calculations we supposed that all the workers decide about the cut. That is why the utilities are averaged. Otherwise the utility of the players would differ. From this we have our last result:
then there eXIsts p such that the workers will ul +u -u O refuse the wage increase, PROOF: Take u'(x) = u(x) -u(O). Then we can make ev ery calculation with
. By the hypothesIs -u+p -u+p F(O, 6,5) = u(I)-(1-6)u(I+0) > 0, and by the continuity of F (that comes from u) it is possible to choose 0 < p < 6, near to 5, such that F(O, o, p) > O. This implies (No, No) is N.E. for these combinations of () 1 {) and p. The economic intuition behind t.his result is clear: if the un employment rate is high enough, then the ubion will take care of its unemployed. In this case t.he workers are altruistic. On the other hand if 6 is low enough 1 then every increase in wages is ac cepted. Also we have that if the unemployment cut is low, then the wage increase is accepted.
Conclusion.
A model which sheds some light on the resistance of workers to reduce their nominal wage is presented. There is no "money illusion". Instead the behaviour is oi{viously utility maximizing. It is provided a rationale for a "kinked" like supply of labour. The 136 !!"l'xl€'! also allows that the wage goes dmvn in some situations, that are clearly the ones in which the probability of being fired is high enough. Moreover, the conclusions are robust to the number of firms. The influence of risk aversion is observed: it increases the region where the cut in wages is accepted, and decreases the region where it is refused. '¥e include also a section in which wage increases are discussed within the framework of the model. In this case wage increases are refused only in case of high prevailing unemployment rate and also high cut of unemployed employees by the firms.
One point that one could observe also, is the fact that wages, as we measure, are only referred to the employed part of the popu lation. If one sees employment as a lottery, as this model suggestsl it could be argued that the level of nominal wages should be cor rected to incorporate the value of this lottery: in our simple case this would mean only multiplying it by the probability of not being fi red.
Another message we wanted to make clear is never to believe in nominal wage flexibility (downward) to the adjustment of the economy: either it must happen through the price level or should be done in a centralized way, unilaterally (this because the situa tion that everybody is with the wage cut is Pareto optimal in the context of the model in its symmetric form).
For further developments we would think upon closing the model, by including unemployment in the utility of employees and the production side together. Also one could try to relax the h:Fpotheses, especially the one concerning strikes. where the usual equilibrium (non-cooperative) is a strictly domi nant one.
Theorem 1. Let r be a symmetric n-person game, where #Si = 2Vi. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
PROOF: The proof is done by induction. For n = I the result is trivial. The induction step will make use only of n -I :2: I, so that we can go directly to it, without having to bother with 71 = 2. Therefore, suppose it is true for n -1. I will prove it is true for n. In fact, let us fix the action of player n. Sup pose also SI = ... = Sn = {a, b} . Without loss of generality \ve can assume we fixed his action as a . '''Ie now have a game with the n -I first players that is also symmetric. Thus, by the induction hypothesis there is an n-tuple (Sll'" ,Sn_l) that is e<:juilibrium of this game (with the nth player restricted to play a-). To check if (SI,· .. ,Sn-lla) is a Nash equilibrium of r, we 11 ave only to check for player n . Let us suppose that this is.not Nash. Then I will construct another n-tuple that is a Nash equi Ii brium, and this will conclude the proof. If (SI,··· ,Sn-I, a) is not Nash, then it must be the case that Un(SI,··· ,sn-lob ) > U�(S 2 "·· ,s"_I,a). Suppose i such that we have Si = a. It fol lows by the symmetry hypothesis (taking (F to be the permuta tion that exchange i with n and leave the rest fixed), in this case, that lin(SI,··· ,sn_l,a) = Ui(SI,··· ,sn_l,a) :2: (by the induc-jth ith tion hypothesis) Ui(51,· .. ,1 , ... ,5n_" J ) = (by symmetry)
Un(51,'" ,a, '" ,5n_l,b) = (as 5i = a) = Un(51,'" ,5n_ l ,b) . But this would contradict Un(51,'" , 5n_1, b) > Un(51,'" , 5n_l, a) =} 51 of aVi of n. Then 5i = Wi. I claim that, in this case, the n-tuple (b, ... , b) is a Nash equilibrium. To see this, by symmetry, it is enough to check the Nash inequality for any one given player. Let us check it for player n. We have un( b,· .. , b) > un( b,·· . , b, a) . This proves the iuequality for player n, and therefore the theorem follows. 0 Theorem 2. Let r be a symmetric n-person game, where #Sj = 2, Vi. Suppose there is a unique Nash equilibrium. Then it is a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium.
PROOF: The proof is again by induction. For n = 1 the result is trivial. Let the result be valid for n -1, n <: 2. Call the equilib rium n-tuple (81, . . . ! Sn), Si e Si . Suppose for some i and j we have Si of 5j . Let it be 5i = a and Sj = b. As a short hand, call Li,; to ithjth
(2) Uj (5_i,;, a, b) <: Uj (5_i,;, a, a) . But applying, as in the previous theorem, the permutation (ij) (change the places of i and j, letting ith jth the rest unchanged), we have: ui(Li,j, 1 ,1 ) = Uj(Li,j,b,a), Ui(S_i,j, b, b) Uj(5_i,j, b, b), Uj(Li,;, a, b) = Ui(5_i,j,b,a), Uj(5_i,j,a,a) = Ui(5_i,j,a,a) and hence by (1) and (2) the Nash inequalities are verified for (S_i,j, b, a) for players i and j. If k of i,j, by symmetry Uk(B-i,j,Si, Sj) = Uk (S_i,j, Sj, Si )V( SI, . . . ,sn)' This implies that N ash in equalities are verified also in this case => (S_i,j I h, a) is another N ash equilibrium. Therefore if (51, .. . , 5n) is the unique one, it must be the case that 51 = ... = sn. Without loss of gener ality we may assume (a, ' " ,a) is this point. Consider now the game r; as being r when we restrict player i to play!!.. This is a (n -l)=person game. I claim that (a,··· ,a) is the unique "---v---' n-1 times Nash equilibrium of this game, Vi. Suppose it is not. Let (Li) itk jtk itk be it. Then uj(L; ,1 ) :::: uj(L;,j, ,s; ,2 )Vs; e S;. Sup pose there exists j '" i such that Sj = a . Then we could eas ily verify that the Nash inequality would hold for i in the point (L;,a) (by symmetry). This would be a contradiction with the fact (a,··· ,a) is the unique Nash for r. Therefore it has to be the different from the original one. This is also a contradiction, and therefore we have that (a,··, ,a) is the unique Nash for ri, given
'--v---' (n-I)-times any i. By the induction hypothesis it is a strictly dominant strat egy equilibrium for r;. By symmetry we want to check only that a is strictly dominant strategy for player 1. Let us look at r , . Then proves the theorem.
0
The hypotheses of the theorem are strictly necessary. It is ea. .sily seen that the symmetry is indispensable. The following ex ar:nple shows that if the number of strategies increase the result win not hold. E"XAMPLE 3: Let r be as below:
(a,a) is the unique Nash equilibrium. However u,(a,c) = 2 < 
